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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the extent to which technical barriers to trade
(=TBT’s) may distort or restrict trade. TBT’s can arise when exporters have to comply with
requirements for, amongst other issues, health, safety, environmental and consumer protection that
diﬀer from those in the domestic market. The need to adapt product design, re-organize production
systems, re-labeling costs and the costs of multiple testing and certification can entail additional
fixed costs for suppliers of exported goods to a particular country. The removal of such TBT’s due
to diﬀerences in technical regulations amongst member states and accession countries is central to
the Single Market Program (SMP).
EU policy oriented towards technical regulations and testing and certification requirements,
deals with the harmonization of technical regulations amongst the member states.1 Directives are
then adopted which require member states to replace national regulations by harmonized procedures
and standards. Once these regulations are adopted, this implies that each exporter still has to pay
a fixed cost to adapt to the harmonized regulatory process. So a key feature of the harmonization
of technical regulations that is stressed in this paper, is their eﬀect on a fixed cost, which is
entirely supported by the exporting firm. As a further example, environmental rules on recycling
arrangements, emissions, use of renewable materials may incur a (one time) burden for exports as
a result of the compliance with the harmonization of EU environmental regulations.
This paper provides theoretical and empirical work. We consider a two-country, three-stage
model, in which a home firm competes against a foreign firm for exports to a third market. Fur-
thermore, we address the issue of government intervention in supporting R&D activity. In the first
stage home government can commit to an R&D subsidy; in the second stage the two firms decide
1For a more detailed analysis on the sources of the EU approach to eliminate technical barriers to trade, see
Brenton et al. 2001.
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upon the process innovation activity while in the third period they compete in quantities.
Our main assumption is that process R&D has a positive spillover eﬀect in lowering the compli-
ance cost. Moreover, two kinds of asymmetries are present. The first asymmetry is that firms diﬀer
in their capacity of internalizing the spillover that is generated from the R&D activity. Whether
or not, one firm has a cost advantage in its compliance cost depends on the intensity of a positive
R&D spillover. The intensity of a positive R&D spillover may have diﬀerent degrees. It may well
be so, that the type of R&D required for process development (cost-reducing R&D) may generate
the advantage that firms have been able to develop configurations of equipment that can, with
little modification, adapt to varying circumstances. Thus the need to completely redesign most
of the productive process can be reduced and products can be manufactured easily without too
much eﬀort.2 As an example, minor product modification and adaptation has been considerably
eased with the use of CAD. Edquist and Jacobsson (1988) point out that CAD software embodies
enough accumulated design and knowledge as to adapt product design to local market conditions,
match raw material and component availability. The regulation of toxic substances in particular
has been viewed as an industry where technological advancement has led to significant advances in
preventing pollution (Ashford 2002).
The second asymmetry considered in this model, is that for the home firm the domestic gov-
ernment intervenes by providing R&D subsidies. The role for the government is to provide direct
support of R&D and incentives for innovation through providing an appropriate subsidy to stimu-
late a favorable climate for engaging in R&D activities.
2 It may well be so, that some degree of re-configuration of the production process may not be so easily implemented
for more complex machinery that entails a lot of process innovation R&D. An example might be, the development
of sophisticated robots or microelectronics that have created complex advancement in the industrial automation
of industries. We ignore this eﬀect. Thus the externality of R&D only interacts positively with the fixed cost of
adaptability.
3
To check the empirical relevance of our model, we consider two hypotheses that need a further
econometric investigation:
(1) R&D spillovers have a positive impact on a country’s export performance while the compli-
ance cost with EU harmonized regulations has a dampening eﬀect.
(2) government subsidized R&D is complementary to a firm’s R&D.
To test the first hypothesis, we use the gravity model of international trade flows between 14 EU
countries and 6 CEEC countries. In order to reliably measure the incidence of the harmonization
of EU standards and the compliance cost, this model is applied to trade data that diﬀerentiate
sectors according to a European classification, which specifically identifies sectors where the EU
has sought to introduce the harmonized of environmental regulations. Following much of theo-
retical and empirical literature on R&D spillovers, the gravity equation is augmented with R&D
expenditure taken as a proxy for innovation.3 Although most studies have concentrated on the
eﬀects of spillovers on productivity, few attempts have analyzed the impact of innovation on export
performance.4 The second hypothesis is tested using a Box-Cox procedure allowing for non-linear
relationship similar to that of Levy (1990), where we control for country specifics based on data
compiled by the OECD statistical compendium.
A series of articles (at the abstract level) have studied the economic eﬀects of international
(governmental) standardization policies (Wallner 1998; Baldwin 2000; Eisenmann and Verdier 2002;
Fisher and Serra 1999). However, an important diﬀerence is that we allow for the interaction
of R&D externalities with a fixed adaptation cost when firms export abroad. In general, the
literature on minimum quality standards, (Shy 1991; Kende 1991); respectively, consider the eﬀect
of compatibility international standards on licensing and on the incentives for conducting R&D. The
3A number of papers have examined the relationship between R&D and productivity. Examples include Coe and
Helpman (1993), Nadiri and Prucha (1997).
4See for instance, Soete (1987), Léon-Ledesma (2000)
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literature analyzing the strategic use of governmental standards and R&D (Jensen and Thursby
1991; Regibeau and Rockett 1994) formalize the idea that standardization policy may be used
to protect the research of domestic firms and improve the chances of domestic firms in R&D
competition. Gandal and Shy (1996) also focuses on the link between the eﬀect of standardization
policies and protection, but analyze how this aﬀect trade and also looks on how institutions such
as standardization unions aﬀect trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical model. In Section 3 we solve
the three-stage game and draw the main results on market competition and government policy.
Section 4 considers the empirical models and provides the main econometric results. Section 5
concludes followed by some policy implications for CEEC countries.
2 A Simple Duopoly Model
The model that we use is similar to that of Spencer and Brander (1983). We examine a duopoly
model in which two firms, i and j, are located in two diﬀerent countries and export a homogeneous
good to a third country.5 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that firm i is the home firm
while firm j is the foreign firm. In order to export the good, they have to comply with standard
requirements that bring an additional fixed cost. Firms invest in process innovation to reduce their
production cost. Moreover, we assume that this kind of R&D activity creates a positive spillover
that lowers the compliance cost. Finally, the government where firm i resides can grant an R&D
subsidy to its home firm.
The game takes place in three stages. In the first stage government commits to the R&D
subsidy; in the second stage firms choose the level of R&D and in the third stage they compete
5The third market framework has often been used before. Examples include Spencer and Brander (1983), Brander
and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986) among others.
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in the market by setting quantities. The temporal sequence reflects the conventional wisdom that
government can commit to an R&D subsidy at the start of the game, while firms carry out R&D
before that production takes place.
The inverse demand function is given by:
p = a− b (qi + qj) , (1)
where a and b are positive constants, qi and qj indicates respectively firm i’s and firm j’s export.
Marginal cost of production c is equal for both firms. However, by investing in process innovation
this cost can be reduced by a quantity xi (xj). Following the common assumption of diminishing
returns (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988), firms incur in R&D costs given by γ
x2i
2
and γ
x2j
2
respectively, where γ relates to the eﬃciency of the R&D technology: the higher the value of γ, the
more expensive (i.e. the less eﬃcient) is process R&D, and vice versa.
As we introduced before, R&D activity creates a positive externality that acts in reducing
the adaptation cost. The empirical models of the next section will support this hypothesis. The
adaptation cost is then given by:
si (xi) =
_
s − θi xi
sj (xj) =
_
s − θj xj
where θi,j ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter indicating the intensity of the spillover eﬀect. We assume that
firms diﬀer in the ability to internalize the spillover from process R&D, hence θi 6= θj . Furthermore,
si(xi) > 0, i.e. θi <
_
s
xi
= eθi and similarly for sj (xj).
The profit functions of the two firms are defined as:
πi = (p− c+ xi)qi − si (xi)− γ
x2i
2
+ δxi. (2)
πj = (p− c+ xj)qj − sj (xj)− γ
x2j
2
(3)
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where δ is the per unit R&D subsidy.
Home government maximizes welfare, given by profits net of subsidy payments:
Wi = πi − δxi = (p− c+ xi)qi − si (xi)− γ
x2i
2
(4)
Our strategy in the next section is to solve the game backwards in order to get the equilibrium
level of the R&D subsidy and to evaluate its policy implications.
3 The three stage game
Let us solve backwards the three stage game. Firms choose their outputs given both the subsidy
and the R&D and output levels of the rival. The home and foreign first-order conditions for output
satisfy:6
∂πi
∂qi
= a− c− bqi − b(qi + qj) + xi = 0
∂πj
∂qj
= a− c− bqj − b(qj + qi) + xj = 0
from which we get the output levels as a function of R&D expenditures:
qi(xi, xj) =
a− c+ 2xi − xj
3b
(5)
qj(xi, xj) =
a− c+ 2xj − xi
3b
(6)
By plugging the above output levels into the original profit functions (2) and (3), we get the
optimal profits as a function of the R&D levels, indicated by πi(xi, xj) and πj(xi, xj), that we omit
for the sake of brevity.
6Second-order conditions are always satisfied, as one can easily check.
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We now pass to the second stage of the game, in which firms decide upon the R&D levels. From
first order conditions we get:7:
∂πi(xi, xj)
∂xi
=
4
9b
(a− c+ 2xi − xj)− γxi + δ + θi = 0
∂πj(xi, xj)
∂xj
=
4
9b
(a− c+ 2xj − xi)− γxj + θj = 0
These two expressions can be combined to obtain the R&D levels as a function of home gov-
ernment’s R&D subsidy:
xi(δ) =
16c+ 4a (3bγ − 4) + 3b [(9bγ − 8) (δ + θi)− 4(θj + cγ)]
(3bγ − 4) (9bγ − 4) (7)
xj(δ) =
4 [4c+ a (3bγ − 4)− 3b(cγ + δ + θi)] + 3b (9bγ − 8) θj
(3bγ − 4) (9bγ − 4) . (8)
We complete the backwards solution by considering the first stage of the game, where home
government sets the R&D subsidy. By substituting (7) and (8) into (4) we obtain an expression of
home welfare as a function of δ and of the parameters of the model. Finally, through
∂W (δ)
∂δ
= 0
we obtain the optimal R&D subsidy:
δ∗ =
8
3
γ [4c+ a (3bγ − 4)− 3b (cγ − 2θi + θj)]− 4θi
bγ[160 + 27bγ (3bγ − 8)]− 32 . (9)
It can be easily demonstrated that:
Proposition 1 The home government always grants a positive R&D subsidy that is proportional
to the home firm’s comparative advantage in the exploitation of the spillover.
Proof First of all, second order condition for the first stage require that bγ[160+27bγ (3bγ − 8)]−
32 > 0; this implies that the denominator of (9) is always positive. The sign of the optimal
7Second order conditions require γ > 8
9b
.
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subsidy depends then on the numerator. The threshold value of θi such that the numerator
becomes positive is:
θi >
3b (cγ + θj) + γ [a(4− 3bγ)− 4c]
6bγ − 4
which is positive in the interval of parameters that we consider and it is increasing in θj . For
the home firm, hence, the higher the spillover of the rival, the higher the value of the own
spillover necessary to get the subsidy.
Secondly, when we check for non-negativity of quantities, it appears that qi > 0 when the
above condition on θi is satisfied, otherwise the firm is out of the market. ¥
As a consequence, in all the intervals of the parameter values for which the duopoly game has
an economic meaning, then, the government intervenes to support local R&D through a subsidy.
It is worth noting that ∂δ
∗
∂θi > 0 and
∂δ∗
∂θj < 0; as a consequence, home government increases the
amount of the R&D subsidy when the local firm is able to capture the spillovers deriving from
R&D activity. At the same time, it tends to decrease such a subsidy when the ability of the rival
firm to exploit the spillover increases.
From the simple model described above it emerges a very interesting result. The degree of the
spillovers, captured by θi and θj respectively, becomes an indicator of the relative performance of
firm’s eﬃciency in exploiting process R&D to reduce the compliance cost. A government wishing
to help its local firm should then provide a subsidy proportional to the technological advantage of
its local firm over the rival.
In the next sections we will provide empirical results that support the above conclusion.
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4 The empirical model and data
In this section, we focus on two issues, which are quite diﬀerent and have diﬀerent implications.
First of all, we are interested in investigating the relationship between innovation, the harmonization
of regulations and export performance. Here we present evidence by pooling data of 21 European
countries, for the period 1995-1998, by employing diﬀerent specification of the gravity equation.
Pointed out by the empirical literature on innovation, we also capture systematic deviations of
trade patterns by controlling for domestic and international spillovers. Due to the nature of our
data (harmonization of EU environmental regulations), we also control for diﬀerences between
EU membership and 6 CEEC applicant countries. Secondly, we are interested in the existence of
diﬀerences/similarities in the technology intensity between countries by focusing on the relationship
between R&D subsidies and the level of R&D expenditure by industry (firm). However, we are
also interested in analyzing whether this relationship varies from country to country: we employ
aggregate level time series observations in panel form for two diﬀerent samples consisting of 6 EU
and 6 CEEC countries for the period of 1991-2000 and control for individual country-specific eﬀect.
4.1 Export performance, harmonized EU regulation and R&D spillovers
The standard framework to account for bilateral trade flows is the gravity model. The empirical
success can be attributed from the model’s consistently high statistical fit. Typically in a log-linear
form, this model takes its name from the prediction that trade between countries is promoted by
their economic size (income, production) and constrained by their geographic distances. Other
important features characterizing the international exchange of products between countries can
easily be added. For example, Frankel et al. (1994) add dummy variables for country pairs, which
share a common language and a common border, as well as trading blocks dummy variables, which
evaluate the eﬀect of preferential trading agreements. The coeﬃcients for these dummy variables
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are expected to be positive. Although its empirical success can be attributed from the model’s
consistently high statistical fit, it was also criticized because it lacked a theoretical foundation.
These foundations were, subsequently, developed by many authors. More recent applications show
that this model is compatible with monopolistic competition models of trade: allowing for economies
of scale (Helpman 1987; Anderson and van Wincoop 2001) and for technological diﬀerences across
countries (Davis 1996).
Given its performance in explaining trade flows, the gravity model considered here takes the
following form:
lnXij,t = αi + β1,t lnYi + β2,t lnYj + β3,t lnDij + β4,t lnADAPTi + β5,t lnR&Di + (10)
β6,t ln(wR&Dj) +
X
n
δk,tDUMij + εij,t
where
Xij are exports from country i to country j at time t;
Yi and Yj are the total production from country i and j;
DUMij are a set of n dummy variables (separate dummy variables are included to reflect the eﬀects
of adjacency between i and j, the case when i and j share the same language, (interacting)
dummies for the exporting CEEC and EU countries and time dummies);
Dij is the distance between the trading centres of the two countries;
ADAPTi is the total cost of compliance with the EU environmental standards;
R&DSPILLi is the R&D intensity of country, i, and is given by the amount of R&D expenditure
per unit of output produced.
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R&DSPILLj denotes the R&D intensity of country j, weighted by a coeﬃcient, w, which is
measured by country j0s share in country i0s aggregate imports;
The economic variables in the gravity model (incomes, distance) define the ‘normal’ level of
trade. On the assumption that the gravity model is well-specified the dummy variables seek to
capture systematic deviations from this normal pattern of trade due to physical adjacency and
language. However, our theoretical model points out three additional important factors in trade
performance.
First of all, for those sectors where diﬀerences in national technical regulations are important,
an additional trade cost arises when exporting countries comply with the harmonization process of
EU environmental standards. In the gravity equation, this eﬀect is captured by ADAPTi, which is
defined as the industry-expenditure on environmental protection of country i. It is reasonable to
assume that the compliance process in the area of environmental protection will have a significant
impact of the overall trade performance of EU countries. For example, it has been observed that
in the production process of heavy polluting industries such as, chemicals, petrochemical, steel and
paper, firms may face substantial costs as a result of the compliance with environmental directives
related to pollution emissions and waste (Dziegielewska 1999).
The second determinant of trade is the technological endowment of a country. In our model,
R&D intensity, R&DSPILLi, is defined as R&D expenditure undertaken by firms relative to pro-
duction by country i.. We also construct the R&D intensity of country j, R&DSPILLj , in order
to capture the eﬀect of foreign innovation on domestic imports.8 This estimate is an imported
share weighted average to reflect the relative importance of bilateral trade between a given pair of
countries. Empirical work indicates that technology is positively related to export performance.9
8Coe and Helpman (1995) provide evidence on the extent and importance of foreign R&D spillovers for explaining
productivity growth.
9See, amongst other, Wakelin (1998), Soete (1987), Miguel Leon-Ledesma 2000), Fagerberg (1988).
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As we have mentioned in the introduction, evidence based on case studies, suggests that high R&D
intensity increases the capacity and flexibility of production facilities. Since we are utilizing infor-
mation on the sectorial incidence of environmental EU regulations (through mandated directives),
embodied in our trade data, we expect that high levels of R&D expenditure will facilitate the
development of new technologies/products in response to environmental regulations, lower produc-
tions costs and improve trade performance. The regulation of toxic substances in particular has
been viewed as an industry where technological advancement has led to significant advances in
preventing pollution (Ashford 2002).
Thirdly, it should be noted that the choice of the group countries (15 EU countries and 6 CEEC
countries) that we included in our sample was chosen for three reasons. The first reason is that
the asymmetric nature of our theoretical model stipulates that we should be focusing on countries
with diﬀerent levels of R&D intensities. Our data on the level R&D intensity reveals that with
the exception of Poland and Czech Republic, all other CEEC countries have the lowest level. The
second reason is that the compliance procedure, in the area of EU environmental regulations, does
not perfectly coincide between the EU and the CEEC countries. As pointed out by Dziegielewska
(1999), ”the EU countries are mainly concerned with global environmental problems, such as de-
creasing greenhouse gas emissions, ozone-layer protection, acidification reductions, etc. while the
candidate countries are primarily interested in solving the most pressing local environmental prob-
lems such as, waste, lead reductions”. An additional factor may be a time-varying eﬀect. For the
current member countries, the compliance with that the EU environmental standards assume in-
stant harmonization while CEEC countries are still in a transition period. As a result, we therefore
control for the interaction of country group dummies in one of our gravity specifications. Finally,
the choice of 6 CEEC countries was also limited by data availability.
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4.2 The relationship between governmental R&D subsidies and firm’s R&D
expenditure
We rely on a simple R&D investment model borrowed from Levy (1990) that considers a firm’s
funded R&D as a function of output, government funding of R&D performed by firms and country-
specific fixed eﬀect. To estimate the model, we employ a Box-Cox procedure simultaneously with
the pooled estimation. We run this regression for two samples: six EU countries (France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, Portugal and the UK) and 6 CEEC countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic,
Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia) using a sample period of 1990-2000 and 1991-2000, respectively.
The basic model is
(INDFINR&Dλi − 1)/λ = αi + β1,t(GOV FINR&Dλi − 1)/λ+ β2,t(Y λi − 1)/λ+ (11)
+β3,tCTRYD ∗ (GOV FINR&Dλi − 1)/λ+ εi,t
where:
t are the time periods and i are the countries;
INDFINR&Di is the private industry R&D expenditure by country i;
GOV FINR&Di is the government funding of R&D expenditure performed by country i;
Yi is the total production of country i;
CTRYD is a country-specific dummy.
4.3 Data Sources and Methodology
Data are available from diﬀerent sources. Trade data comes from EUROSTAT and are collected at
8-digit level of the European combined nomenclature trade classification, which covers more than
10000 products. Our data set comprises bilateral exports for the period 1995-1998 between each
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of the 14 EU countries including bilateral exports between each of the 14 EU countries and the
following CEEC countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania.10
The sample therefore covers a total of [(14*19 + 6*14)*3] =1400 observations. We derived the
trade data according to the NACE industrial classification, which covers around 100 manufacturing
industries. Since a partial focus of our empirical work is the relationship between exports, the
harmonization of EU environmental standards and the compliance cost, we need to reliable measure
the sectorial incidence of environmental regulations. To do so, we first utilize information coming
from a detailed study undertaken for the Commission’s review of the impact of the Single Market
in the EU (European Commission (CEC) 1998). This study provides information at the 3-digit
level of the NACE classification of whether trade is aﬀected by technical regulations including
environmental rules. Trade data according to the NACE classification were obtained from the
COMEXT database.11 Trade was then aggregated into one broad group, consisting of all sectors
were diﬀerences in environmental regulations constrain trade flows according to this classification
in CEC (1998). The 3-digit sectors that we selected are reported in Table 1.
10Comext only reports trade for Belgium and Luxembourg treated as one.
11The NACE is the industrial classification used by the Statistical Oﬃce of the European Communities (Eurostat).
A detailed definition of the classification is presented in CEC (1998).
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Table 1: Sectors subject to the harmonization of environmental regulations
110-140 Mining and Quarrying 321-328 Machines and equipment
151-152 Extr. & prod.of nuclear materials 342 Manuf. of electrical mach.
244 Man. of art. Asbestos 343 Electr. Appar.for ind. use
245 Work. of stones & non-met. prod. 347 Manuf. electr. Lamps
247 Manuf. of glass & glassware 351 Manuf. motor vehicles
251-259 Chem, petrochem., pharmac. 363 Man. of cycles, motor cycles
314 Structural metal products 411-419 Food products
315 Boilers, reservoirs, tanks 471-472 pulp and paper
316 Heating appliances 481-482 Rubber products
In order to calculate the compliance cost with the harmonization of EU environmental regula-
tions, we use an indicator of the economic resources spent on environmental protection. We are
aware that this is not an entire cost in alignment with the harmonization of environmental stan-
dards since we are not including institutional and administrative costs; however, for the purpose of
our study, the costs that we are capturing are directly related to the production process as well as
those costs that serve to abate the pollution stemming from the production process as a result of
their compliance with EU environmental standards. We rely on two sources. Wherever possible, we
use data on the ’industry expenditure on environmental protection’ from EUROSTAT. When the
data are unavailable, we fill in missing observations with comparables from the various statistical
institutes. The environmental protection expenditure is classified in diﬀerent activities according
to the Single European Standard Statistical Classification of Environmental Protection Activities
(CEPA) broken down in the following groups: water & soil, industrial pollution, air, noise, nature
and forestry protection, as well as chemical substances and genetically modified organisms.
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To this data set, we add a number of other variables that are necessary to estimate the gravity
model. Distance between countries is measured as the great circle distance between the national
capitals. We add production in total manufacturing and GDP (constant) from EUROSTAT. When
production data were unavailable, we fill in missing observations from the OECD statistical com-
pendium. When all else fails, missing data, then, are approximated by applying a trend of the
gross rate of value-added (in quantity).
Finally, this paper also requires data on innovation measures. This data is taken from the
OECD statistical compendium. R&D expenditure performed by firms (GERD) and government
funding of R&D expenditure performed by firms (BERD) is expressed in constant USD and were
converted to the EURO using the exchange rate listed in the IMF ’Financial Statistics’. For a
number of countries; R&D expenditure data are not available for the full period 1990-1998, in
which case, an estimated equation relating R&D expenditures to output was used to predict the
missing R&D expenditure data.
5 Results
5.1 Model 1
Using data for 21 countries between 1995 and 1998, we pool the cross-section data over time
because the extra time-series observations result in more accurate estimates compared to the use
of cross-section data to estimate gravity models. One reason is that using panel data allows for
a better control for the eﬀects of missing or unobserved trade determinants, which are otherwise
captured by the error term (Egger 2000). Consequently, we also introduce time eﬀects, which are
jointly significant using the F-test.12 In order to deal with the presence of heteroscedasticity, we
12The general interpretation of the time estimates can reflect many interpretations. In gravity, these factors are
generally not treated as random and are usually interpreted as the overall business cycle, the general development
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use the approach proposed by Harvey (1976) where the square of the weight (σ2) is constructed
as the exponential function of the predicted ln eˆij2. All the variables in the regression are than
weighted by the inverse of the variance in order to avoid ineﬃcient estimates in the presence of
heteroscedasticity.13
We also use instrumental variables since production and exports are most likely jointly de-
termined in equilibrium (Harrigan 1996). In order to deal adequately with this problem, several
endowment measures are used as instruments.14 The set of instruments are (1) the log of capital
stock from the current and previous year, (2) the log of skilled labor (the total number of persons
employed who are engaged in the productive activity of a given industrial branch) from the current
and previous year and (3) current population.
The basic results for total bilateral trade flows using diﬀerent specifications of the gravity
equation (1) are reported in Table 2. We proceeded as follows. In column 1, we augmented the
basic gravity equation with the compliance cost variable (ADAPTi) but excluding the domestic
and foreign spillover variables in order to obtain a set of base results. In column (2), we added the
domestic R&D spillover variable, in addition to the standard variables of the first estimation, while
in column (3) we added both the domestic and foreign R&D spillovers. In column (4), we employ
the same gravity specification from column (2) but we let interact a EU (if countryi = EU else 0)
of openness, or amongst others, the process of globalization. Note: in the gravity specification of column 1, Table 1,
the F-test did not reject the hypothesis that these time eﬀects are jointly zero.
13See Judge et al. (1979). By applying the Breusch-Pagan test for the OLS estimate using the gravity specification
of column 2, Table 1, yields a chi-square of 137.9 (p-value=0.000). We consequently carried out a series of Breusch-
Pagan tests for several country groups (ranked by their GDP) as well diﬀerent versions of the gravity specifications
(GDP weights, quadratic transformations) but the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was rejected in most cases.
The Breusch-Pagan test statistic using the Harvey procedure substantially reduced heteroscedasticity with a Breusch-
Pagan test statistic of 17.5.
14The gravity literature uses population as an instrument, but many authors conclude that this does not modify
the overall fit of the regression.
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and CEEC (if countryi = CEEC else 0) dummies with both the domestic spillover variable and
the cost compliance variables.
In line with the gravity literature, the overall fit is good (R2=0.83, 0.84) and all the variables
of the basic regression have the expected sign. It is evident that both the R&D spillover eﬀect and
the compliance cost are significant in general.15 When we take these eﬀects jointly, we see that
the R&D intensity has a significant and positive impact on the trade performance of countries and
therefore reduces the compliance costs that countries face upon exporting abroad. Using the same
specification of column (2), we also compute the correlation between the R&D intensity and the
compliance cost. We find an economic and statistical significant correlation coeﬃcient of -.55. In
column (3), when we introduce the foreign R&D intensities, this jointly eﬀect of all three variables
is even more pronounced. However the magnitude of the R&D intensity are considerable larger
than those from studies that also include international R&D spillovers. In column (4), we allow for
separate coeﬃcients to be estimated for both the R&D intensity and the compliance cost for CEEC
and EU countries. In the case of the eﬀect of the compliance cost on exports, this elasticity is much
higher for our selected CEEC countries in the sample. Although, these results are consistent with
expectations, it is evident that some degree of variation exists across country groups.
15When we introduce simultaneously the R&D intensity interacting with the compliance cost, this generated
variable is not significant anymore. We introduced them separately since it not only gives a better overall fit but also
a better precision to the compliance cost according to the t-statistics. (not reported in the table).
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Table 2: Gravity model for trade in sectors subject to harmonized environmental regulations
1 2 3 4
Ln PRODi
Ln PRODj
Ln Dij
Adjacency
Language
Ln SPILLi
Ln SPILLj
Ln ADAPTi
DEU ∗ Ln SPILLi
DCEEC ∗ Ln SPILLi
DEU ∗ Ln ADAPTi
DCEEC ∗ Ln ADAPTi
Year 96
Year 97
Year 98
Intercept
R2
Estimation Method
Observations
1.02∗∗(0.01)
0.92∗∗(0.01)
−0.95∗∗(0.04)
0.31∗∗(0.09)
0.26∗∗(0.14)
−0.13∗∗(0.03)
0.03(0.06)
0.001(0.06)
−0.01(0.06)
−2.50(0.54)
0.83
WLS-IV
1400
0.97∗∗(0.02)
0.93∗∗(0.01)
−0.90∗∗(0.04)
0.32∗∗(0.09)
0.33∗∗(0.13)
0.70∗∗(0.01)
−0.34∗∗(0.03)
−0.03(0.06)
−0.12∗∗(0.06)
−0.12∗∗(0.06)
0.50(0.62)
0.84
WLS-IV
1400
0.97∗∗(0.01)
0.92∗∗(0.01)
−0.84∗∗(0.05)
0.37∗∗(0.09)
0.35∗∗(0.13)
0.72∗∗(0.01)
0.22∗∗(0.06)
−0.34∗∗(0.03)
−0.12∗∗(0.06)
−0.16∗∗(0.06)
−0.17∗∗(0.06)
0.99∗(0.63)
0.84
WLS-IV
1400
0.94∗∗(0.01)
0.94∗∗(0.02)
−0.90∗∗(0.04)
0.31∗∗(0.09)
0.25∗∗(0.13)
0.54∗∗(0.08)
0.35∗∗(0.10)
−0.14∗∗(0.05)
−0.48∗∗(0.11)
−0.01∗∗(0.06)
−0.07(0.06)
−0.17∗∗(0.06)
−0.13(0.66)
0.84
WLS-IV
1400
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
** denotes significance at 1 percent and * denotes significance at 5 percent
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5.2 Model 2
In line with Levy (1990), this model is estimated by a maximum likelihood procedure allowing all
variables to be Box-Cox transformed for each sample 16 The transformation of which maximizes
the likelihood is solved for (lambda) values between 0 and 1 with 0.005 increments. The results are
reported in table 3.
Table 3: The impact of government subsidies on firms’ R&D
CEEC EU
GovR&Di 0.003∗∗(0.002) 0.002∗∗(0.0008)
PRODj 0.016∗∗(0.003) 0.05∗∗(0.02)
GovR&Di*CZ 0.007∗∗(0.001) GovR&Di*IT 0.002(0.001)
GovR&Di*PO 0.001(0.0009) GovR&Di*SP 0.003∗∗(0.001)
GovR&Di*RO −0.008∗∗(0.002) GovR&Di*FR 0.005∗∗(0.0001)
GovR&Di*SR −0.007∗∗(0.003) GovR&Di*GE 0.002(0.001)
GovR&Di*SL −0.011∗∗(0.003) GovR&Di*UK 0.003∗∗(0.001)
Intercept 11.47∗∗(0.31) 21.02∗∗(4.76)
λ 0.21 0.28
R2 0.88 0.98
Estimation Method Box-Cox Box-Cox
Observations 60 66
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
** denotes significance at 1 percent and * denotes significance at 5 percent
16 In a simple production function, Levy (1990) models a non-linear relationship between a firm’s R&D and gov-
ernment funded R&D.
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The impact of government involvement in the area of R&D activities is likely to diﬀer across
countries, we; therefore, added country-specific dummies interacting with the Box-Cox Gov R&D.
Results are reported in table 2. The overall picture reveals that the impact of government-funded
R&D within the two country-group samples somewhat diﬀer across countries . Clearly, for the EU
countries, this is positive for each country. While the contribution of government-funded R&D for
Romania, the Slovak republic and Slovenia is negative, this eﬀect is positive for Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary. We will return to this issue in the next section.
6 Conclusions with Policy Implications for Applicant Countries
in Central and Eastern Europe
A first aspect we have examined is that the eﬀect of R&D spillovers in reducing the compliance
cost varies. Supported by our empirical results, it is suggested that, being a EU member ap-
pears to allow countries to significantly overcome the compliance cost that is generated by the
harmonization of environmental standards. But, there remain substantial problems within the
EU in completing the ”environmental acquis” since our results suggest that the negative impact
of the compliance cost on EU trade is significant. Since compliance costs in some sense measure
an industry’s response to regulation, high compliance costs could indicate an ineﬀective response.
This raises two issues. A first issue regarding the post-enlargement situation and in particular,
the impact that enlargement will have on the harmonization process. Clearly, the eﬀorts of the
existing members to eﬀectively implement the alignment of EU environmental regulations must in-
crease in the context of enlargement since the accession of new members will substantially increase
the pressures on the internal market and stretch the abilities to ensure compliance with harmo-
nized directives. Within the EU, environmental regulations and directives are growing steadily in
number and scopes, but the environment continue to be under great stress due to the economic
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growth and consumption of natural resources and energy. Impact assessments published by the
European Environmental Agency indicate that the situation is deteriorating in parallel with the
growth in number of environmental regulations being adopted (EEA 1999). The enlargement will
certainly improve environmental conditions and capabilities for the CEEC countries, but there are
also potential negative sides to an enlargement process. Problems related to the enforcement and
implementation of environmental regulations in the EU will probably be repeated in Central and
Eastern Europe, if not enough resources are invested to bring up the capacity to implement the
alignment process with EU environmental regulations within EU countries. But these investments
will certainly be a heavy burden on both the EU and CEEC countries. Thus, there is a risk that
the political prestige invested in the enlargement process will impose costs on the environment, and
that in the end what matters for the accession countries is growth, which may be prioritized at the
cost of the environment. In that sense, the environment might come under even further pressure
and the gap might continue to grow.
The second but more crucial issue emanating from this empirical finding is that even though
diﬀerences between the CEEC and EU countries are great in terms of complying with the EU
environmental policy, the capacity to implement the acquis seems to be a greater challenges to
enlargement. Our results suggest that the R&D capacity, measured in R&D spillovers is relatively
weak in CEEC countries. Our data on the level R&D intensity (measured in relation to production)
reveals that with the exception of Poland and Czech Republic, all other CEEC countries have the
lowest level. The process of transition can be attributed to this obvious weakness. For example, the
sharp shock model encourages ”short term-term economics” in company planning, whereas R&D
requires long-term perspectives (Grabner 1992, p.219). CEC (1995) reports that reduced public
expenditure, as part of the stabilization program, is leading to a decline in R&D. Williams et al.
(1998) note that the demand for traditional company-level research has declined in favor of imported
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technology, a substitution that has been encouraged by appreciation in the real exchange rate in the
early transition. As we have mentioned in the introduction, it is suggested that high R&D intensity
increases the capacity and flexibility of production facilities. Since we are utilizing information on
the sectorial incidence of environmental EU regulations (through mandated directives), embodied
in our trade data, we expect that high levels of R&D expenditure will facilitate the development of
new technologies/products in response to environmental regulations, lower productions costs and
improve trade performance. In general, however, given the high cost of relative compliance cost
of meeting the acquis, the relatively weak R&D capacity raises the question as to how the CEEC
countries will properly take care of (sustain) their ’obligation’ to enforce the implementation of EU
environmental regulations?
To help answer this central question, it is important to note that, on the positive side, empirical
evidence (Porter 1991; Jaﬀe and Palmer 1996; Ashford et al. 1985) suggest that increasing the
stringency of environmental regulations stimulate incentive for firms to develop new and less costly
ways of reducing pollution, or potentially, entire new methods of production that eliminate particu-
lar types of emissions and reduce cost of production. In this study, we found a negative relationship
between R&D spillovers and the compliance cost supporting this hypothesis; however, an increasing
concern is the economic inequity between the CEEC and current EU countries stemming from the
capacity of complying with environmental regulations.
This bring us to the second aspect of the paper; namely, that solutions involving government
intervention by direct support in terms of R&D subsidies are not themselves suﬃcient to provide
solutions to the sustainability challenges. We have shown that the government can choose between
a R&D tax or subsidy depending on the eﬃcient use of R&D. So when the government commits
to its R&D subsidy, it may distort R&D rivalry by helping some of them at the expense of others.
This type of intervention should merely be considered as a ’soft package’ and purely relying on
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financial loans, funds may not be suﬃcient: investments will continue to be planned and ’financial
support’ is limited17. Our empirical evidence shows, that paradoxically, public R&D subsidies to
some CEEC firms ’crowd out’ the private R&D investment. The capacity or capability for CEE
firms to meet those challenges can be enhanced by increases in R&D knowledge or support from
current EU firms (engineering consulting services, technical assistance, demonstration projects,
training, ) that have ’internalized’ decades of environmental legislation18. This can be enhanced
by a deliberate creation of networks or strategic alliances but in reality, such willingness requires
a climate, which is not necessarily confined to a technological regime, a geographical area and the
reliance of the more liberal forms of R&D modernization on firms’ economic self-interest. The role
of the regulator (European Commission) should not only be limited to a ’creating directives’ and
’monitoring progress’ but to coordinate a more substantive development/transformation process
where firms’ interests collide with public endeavors. Since we have shown that R&D investments
are a proper response to environmental regulations, to the regulator, this suggests that a more
creative use of law is a more promising strategic instrument for achieving the sustainable demands
in the CEEC.
17Extra-budgetary environmental funds are in the process of being formed in nearly every CEEC country and
are operated under the auspices of the national Ministry of Environment. The financial support by the European
Commission is in form of special pre-accession aid funds. However a recent trend in agricultural policy among the
current EU member countries is to redirect the portion of the EU budget previously channeled in the form of farmer
subsidies toward environmental allowances (Dziegielewska 1999).
18Especially, the heavy, basic industries, which are also sometimes the most polluting, unsafe, and resource-intensive
industries, may find it more diﬃcult to meet environmental demands.
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